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Abstract— Many software developers still have little interest in 
software security. To change this, we need ‘interventions’ to 
development teams to motivate and help them towards security 
improvement. An intervention costing less than two days’ effort 
from a facilitator plus half a day of team effort can significantly 
improve that team’s software security. This case study describes 
how this approach was used with one commercial team, and 
identifies its impact using Participative Action Research.  With 
suitable improvements, the approach has the potential to help 
many other development teams. 
Keywords— Developer centered security; case study; software 
security; software developer; intervention; action research 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Software security and privacy are now major issues: the cost 
and potential threat to us all is increasing dramatically [1]. With 
over 100 billion lines of code created a year [1], the effectiveness 
of developers at creating secure software is vital1. 
Unfortunately, many if not most developers consider 
software security to be ‘not their problem’ [2]. Developers may 
expect security to be handled by a different team; consider it too 
expensive to incorporate without a significant drive from 
product management; or simply not know where to start. 
In prior work [3], the authors identified through interviews 
with leading software security experts, a powerful ‘cocktail’ of 
eight, mostly well-known, techniques (including a ‘top five’), to 
encourage and support software development teams to deliver 
secure code. This combination of techniques has the potential to 
improve secure software development. 
 However, prior work has established only the potential; for 
the research to have impact requires us to find ways to 
disseminate knowledge of this ‘cocktail’ to some of the 
hundreds of thousands of programmers who could benefit. In a 
recent paper [18] we suggested a variety of approaches to this 
problem; in this research we investigated one approach in detail: 
having a consultant lead the introduction of the techniques using 
a package of lightweight consultancy ‘interventions’. 
                                                          
1 Throughout this paper we use ‘secure’ and ‘security’ to refer to privacy 
aspects of software development as well as security ones. 
This paper describes four aspects of those interventions: 
• The design of the intervention package and 
methodology used;  
• The background of the software development project 
where it was used; 
• The effect of the interventions on both developers and 
product security;  
• and possible improvements we might make in future.  
The contributions of this work are: 
1. Research on using managerial and process-based 
approaches to developer security rather than on 
delivering better tools,  
2. A low-cost but effective intervention method to help a 
team improve their development security, and 
3. A detailed example of its implementation and the 
consequences.   
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section II establishes the 
existing literature on the subject. Section III explains the 
research and analysis methods in detail. Section IV discusses 
the context and background to the development project. Section 
V discusses the results obtained. And Section VI compares the 
approach with existing practice and identifies future work. 
II. EXISTING WORK 
This section examines existing academic literature and 
related publications on the subject of helping and encouraging 
developers to improve their software security. We explore 
several areas in turn, examining the existing research available 
in each, and moving from the relatively mechanical to more 
sociological approaches. 
A. Encouraging the Adoption of Tools 
Much research has gone into the creation of tools to improve 
security, such as code analyzers [4]–[7]. Rather less, however 
has gone into getting them used. A survey by Johnson et al. 
analyzed ‘Why Don’t Software Developers Use Static Analysis 
Tools to Find Bugs’ [8] and produced a set of recommendations 
for tool functionality; in particular the ability to avoid repeated 
false positives and support for ‘quick fixes’. Jordan et al. [9] 
explored using emails to encourage developers to upgrade to 
more secure versions of components, and suggested a variety of 
other possible interventions, but provided no evidence of 
success.  
Some studies of tool adoption have based their theory on the 
seminal work on getting new ideas adopted, Rogers’ book 
‘Diffusion of Innovations’ (DoI) [10]. Based on extensive 
research and examples, much of this work describes the 
adoption process and reasons for adoption or non-adoption, 
providing a language with which to describe the process. Only 
one chapter, ‘The Change Agent’, describes – though at an 
abstract level – how individuals and organizations may promote 
and stabilize change.  
Witschey et al. [11] suggested that adoption of tools could 
be modelled by DoI theory [10], and used a survey of 40 
developers recruited opportunistically to explore the model. 
They concluded that more experienced, and more inquisitive, 
developers are more likely to adopt tools, and that key deterrents 
were difficult of trialling new tools, and their invisibility – that 
developers are unlikely to notice a colleague using one.  
Xiao et al. [11] reported a DoI-based study, interviewing 40 
professional developers to explore the social factors that led to 
security tool adoption. They found the main reason for adoption 
was recommendation by trusted peers, including high-rated 
experts in discussion forums. Interestingly company policies 
mandating the use of such tools were very effective; all 13 who 
had security tools mandated did use them.  
Research by Dodier-Lazaro et al. [12] surveyed expert users 
about their tool installation choices, finding that they were 
unable to sacrifice consistency and flexibility for security 
benefits. Whilst an article by Bessey et al. [13] describes the 
experience of Coverity in building and marketing a source code 
checking tool for large codebases. They observed that the tool 
needs to deliver a true defect in its first three error messages to 
generate a sale.  
Away from the domain of software security, others have 
investigated the adoption of development tools in general 
software engineering. Murphy-Hill et al. [14] explored how 
developers learned of new tools using 18 interviews and a diary 
study of 76 programmers. They concluded that discovery 
required peer interactions – especially seeing the tools being 
used by colleagues – and that these were surprisingly infrequent. 
B. Encouraging the Adoption of Security-Enhancing 
Activities 
There has been rather less work on encouraging developers 
to use non-tool techniques. Prior to 2010, the main way of 
improving software security was seen to be the ‘Secure 
Development Lifecycle’ (SDL), a prescriptive set of instructions 
to managers, developers, stakeholders and testers [15]. The 
assumption appears to have been that developers, if instructed to 
use an SDL, would do so wholeheartedly – which did not happen 
in practice. Indeed Xiao’s 2014 survey of 40 developers [11], 
found only 2 using them, and none of the three major SDLs 
appears to have been developed much since 2010. 
On the adoption of specific techniques, only code reviews 
have received any academic attention. However, research on 
their effectiveness has been limited to general software 
improvement, rather than specifically as a security technique:  
Baum et al. [16], for example, reviewed a variety of earlier work, 
and interviewed 24 professionals in 19 German companies. 
They conclude that cultural issues, rather than practical ones, 
determined whether code reviews were used, and that reviews 
were best embedded in the development process from the 
beginning of a project.  
C. Consultancy and Training Interventions  
Several research teams have explored the impact of training 
and external involvement on teams’ delivery of secure software.  
A recent paper by Poller et al. [17] describes an ethnographic 
study over 13 months of a depressingly unsuccessful attempt to 
improve security practices long term in an agile development 
team of about 15 people. The study investigated the effect of 
security consultants whose task ‘was not to advise the product 
group on how to change their organizational routines, but to 
challenge and teach them about security issues of their product’. 
This proved insufficient, for two reasons. First, pressure to add 
functionality meant that attention was not given to security 
issues. Second, developers had trouble ‘improving security’ 
because their normal work procedures and ways of structuring 
their work did not support that kind of quality goal. The authors 
concluded that successful interventions would need “to 
investigate the potential business value of security, thus making 
it a more tangible development goal”; and that security is best 
promoted as a team, not individual, effort. 
Türpe et al. [18] reported a similar ethnographic study 
exploring the effect of a penetration testing session and 
workshop on 37 members of a large geographically-dispersed 
project. The results were also not encouraging; the main reason 
suggested by the authors was that the workshop consultant 
highlighted problems without offering much in the way of 
solutions (a behavior this paper’s authors have observed in other 
security practitioners).  
Recent work by Ashenden and Lawrence [19] took a 
different approach. They used an Action Research method to 
investigate and improve the relationships between security 
professionals and business people in a single company, and 
found the approach effective in improving communication, 
though no evidence is yet available of longer-term impact.  
D. Using Formal Education Techniques 
Others have investigated the effect of programmer learning 
on security improvement. Yskout et al. [20] tested if ‘security 
patterns’ (such as described in Schumacher et al.’s book [21]) 
might be an effective intervention to improve secure 
development in teams of student software developers; the results 
suggested a benefit but were statistically inconclusive.  
Acar et al. [22] concluded through a survey of nearly 300 
successful app developers worldwide that they learned security 
using web search and from peers. They also used a practical 
experiment with over 50 Android developers to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the different ways of learning app security; this 
produced the surprising result that programmers using only 
digital books achieved better security than those using web 
search. More recently Acar et al. [23] investigated web-based 
handbooks to see how well they supported such learning; finding 
that very few provided tutorials or exercises, or discussed wider 
aspects of security such as social engineering.  
E. Motivating Change in Development Teams 
To move from delivering insecure code to delivering secure 
code requires a change in thinking in the development teams. A 
variety of research has explored how to engender such a change. 
Dybå [24] performed a wide-ranging quantitative survey of 
Software Process Improvement (SPI) in 120 organizations, and 
concluded that organizational factors were at least as important 
as technical ones. In particular, he identifies business 
orientation, the extent to which SPI goals and actions are aligned 
with explicit and implicit business goals and strategies, as one 
of the factors with the strongest influence on SPI success; 
together with employee participation, the extent to which 
employees use their knowledge and experience to decide, act, 
and take responsibility for SPI. Surprisingly, management 
commitment was not required. The paper also strongly 
recommends that, for SPI, the measurement systems be designed 
by the software developers themselves.  
Beecham et al. [25] conducted a literature review of 92 
papers on programmer motivation in 2008. Though virtually all 
the research cited is about motivation to do the job of 
programming rather than motivation to change behavior, the 
survey identifies that professional programmers tend to be 
motivated most by problem solving, by working to benefit 
others and by technical challenges. Fear of failure was not 
among the list of motivators, which suggests that merely 
frightening developers into security (‘a terrible thing might 
happen’) is unlikely to be an effective strategy to promote secure 
software. This is consistent with Xie et al.’s interviews of 15 
professional programmers [2] to investigate why they believed 
they made security errors; they found a consistent tendency to 
treat security as ‘someone else’s problem’. 
F. Limitations of Existing Literature 
There has been virtually no academic investigation into ways 
to encourage developers to adopt successful security practices. 
Since governments and private companies are now investing 
considerable money into improving developer security, this 
seems an unfortunate omission. In this work we offer an 
experiment investigating one possible way to help developers. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
A. Research Method 
How were we best to structure this work as academic 
research? Given that the researchers themselves directly 
influence the behavior of the research participants – the 
researchers are the intervention – an ethnographic research 
approach was inappropriate. Instead an accepted methodology, 
used in many forms of academic social research, is Action 
Research [26]. This is an approach to research in communities 
that emphasizes participation and action; Action Research aims 
at understanding a situation in a practical context and aims at 
improving it by changing the situation. 
Specifically, we used Participatory Action Research [27], 
with the lead author working, as ‘intervener’, directly with the 
participants. We had a Pragmatic approach, since the intention 
was to primarily to trial the impact of the interventions. Given 
that this was to some extent a pilot project, we had only a single 
feedback cycle [28].  
The key research question was: ‘What effect did the 
interventions have?’ To measure an effect, we needed a baseline 
with no intervention. A-B testing, requiring a different team 
working in parallel, was not practical. Instead, we used a 
longitudinal approach, deducing a baseline (‘no intervention 
situation’) from the initial situation plus a knowledge of the 
original plans by the team leaders to improve security over the 
same timescale.  
First, we interviewed a selection of the future participants to 
establish a baseline in terms of their current understanding, plans 
and practice related to secure software development. We then 
carried out a series of intervention workshops with members of 
the development teams, led by the intervener. Finally, a suitable 
time after the final intervention workshop, we re-interviewed the 
same participants as before. 
The audio recordings of the interviews and most of the 
workshops – a total of 7 hours of audio – were transcribed and 
qualitatively analyzed. In an iterative process, two of the authors 
coded all transcripts. Initially both authors used open coding 
[37] on the first two hours of material, then agreed on a coding 
scheme based on that and the research questions. Differences in 
coding were discussed and resolved between us. The final code 
book consisted of 5 families of codes, making a total of 41 codes, 
applied to 2661 references in total. 
In coding, we were looking for aspects of security 
improvement – including in learning and attitude – implied by 
statements from the speakers. Specifically, we were looking for 
signs of new knowledge in the team, new activities related to 
security, and evidence of improvements in the security of 
developed software; we were also looking for problems they had 
encountered and how they had overcome them; we also recorded 
evidence of baseline security activities and awareness, present 
or planned, before the start of the interventions. 
This research was approved by the Lancaster University FST 
ethics committee.  
B. Implementing the Techniques as Practical Interventions. 
The purpose of this work was to use the eight interventions 
introduced in Section I, which are as follows [3]: 
1. Incentivization 
Session  
A workshop or discussion to help 
developers to understand the impact of 
security issues. 
2. Threat 
Modelling 
Working as a team to identify actors and 
potential threats; following this up with 
risk assessment and mitigation 
decisions. 
3. On-the-Job 
Training 
informal sessions sharing security 
knowledge; also mentoring and having 
developers more expert at security join 
the team.  
4. Continuous 
Reminder 
Regular activities to keep up the team’s 
awareness of the need for security.  
5. Component 
Choice 
Choosing secure components, and 
keeping them up-to-date; adding 
component analysis tools to the 
toolchain. 
6. Automated 
Static Analysis 
Using code analysis tools to identify 
certain categories of security error. 
7. Code Review Introducing scheduled meetings to 
analyze code for security defects; having 
other programmers or security experts 
review code for problems. 
8. Penetration 
Testing 
Having external specialist security 
testers identify flaws, usually using web 
based tools. 
 
However, each intervention had a variety of forms, suitable 
for different development budgets, team sizes, and team 
cultures. What forms would be suitable for us, outside 
interveners, with limited knowledge of the development team? 
Looking at the list of interventions, we observed that four – 
the first four – are to do with process and can be implemented 
for limited cost by a team lead or manager; the next three require 
commitment by the developers; and the last, Penetration 
Testing, is expensive [29]. As outside consultants, therefore, we 
concentrated on the process interventions, and used 
opportunities within the consultancy to consider the remaining 
interventions. 
Perhaps the biggest challenge was to find a suitable way to 
provide the Incentivization Session. From prior work [3], we 
were aware of three forms of such sessions: a two-day training 
course by a security and training professional aware of the kinds 
of attack currently happening on the developers’ system; a long 
personal interview with each one of the developers involved; 
and a full penetration test of the developers’ system to identify 
problems. None of these three approaches was suitable for a 
lightweight intervention. 
Fortunately, while we were working on this challenge we 
received an enquiry from a colleague. He wanted to use a game, 
the ‘Agile Security Game’ [30], invented by the lead author. 
This was based on the ‘Mumba’ role-playing game, invented by 
Frey [31] to help elicit participants’ prior experience of real-life 
security attacks. The ‘Agile Security Game’ variant, however, 
was designed for a conference workshop simply to educate 
developers about security. The colleague wanted to use the game 
to help motivate development teams towards security. After 
some discussion we realized that this game would indeed work 
well as an Incentivization Session, and that there was 
considerable possible benefit for the teams from using the full 
intervention package.  
Threat Modelling, too, was also challenging to implement. 
Much of the literature [32], [33] describes a heavyweight 
process taking a while to set up and requiring considerable 
knowledge of possible technical threats, preferably with support 
from a professional with a detailed understanding of both the 
industry sector and current cyber threats to it. But such a process 
would be expensive in time and commitment, and the required 
professional knowledge was not available to support us. 
However, in this case the researchers’ own experience was 
valuable. As technical lead for a major mobile money project, 
the lead author had faced this problem in a commercial project. 
With the help of Alec Muffett, a consultant security expert, his 
development team had developed a lightweight brainstorming 
process to identify threats and potential attackers [34]. While 
this may have lacked the rigor of the secure-development-
process-based threat modelling approaches used by some large 
companies, it had certainly served to deliver a product which 
was successful as far as its security needs were concerned. 
Accordingly, therefore we determined to use the same approach 
here.  
On-the-Job Training was not required as an external 
intervention in this case; the technical leads were enthusiastic 
about improving security, and were already considering using a 
variety of different approaches, including working through the 
OWASP Top Ten [35]. 
The final process-based intervention was Continuous 
Reminder. For this we agreed to a monthly meeting, by video 
conferencing; its main purpose was to act as a regular ‘nudge’ 
of the importance of security. 
To introduce the more technical interventions, we used an ad 
hoc approach. The facilitator mentioned and discussed each of 
these interventions with the developers during the Threat 
Modelling, the mitigation discussions, and subsequent sessions, 
using comments from the developers as cues.  
C. Intervention Attitude 
We know from literature that developers dislike formal 
processes [24]; we know also that developers, like most other 
people, tend to dislike being told what to do and will react 
against it [33, Ch. 2], So at no point did the facilitator interact 
with the development teams using terms like “you must” or “it’s 
essential that”. On the other hand, we also know from personal 
experience that developers are very happy to solve problems that 
they agree to be important. Therefore, throughout the workshops 
and game, we allowed the developers themselves to drive the 
solutions; as facilitators we provided only guidance. 
D. Scope of this Paper 
This paper describes our activities with a single organization; 
the work is part of a much larger ongoing project, involving 
three organizations in the first year and further organizations 
thereafter. 
IV. THIS PROJECT 
This section discusses the company, project, and 
development team involved. To preserve confidentiality, we 
have changed all names, and the exact functionality of the 
product. 
AyCo is a company employing around 50 people in the UK. 
Set up about 10 years ago, it has a single product which is sold 
both web based as ‘software as a service’, and as an installable 
system for clients’ own sites. The product, ‘Ambassador’, is a 
web-based accounting and planning package suitable for 
managing the working of very large organizations. AyCo’s 
customers include several household names. 
A. Interview Participants 
To help identify the effects of the interventions, we 
interviewed four team members both before and after the 
process. They were chosen to provide a cross section 
representing both experienced and less experienced developers 
in each team. They are shown in Table 1. 
We have included quotations in the remainder of the paper, 
in italics. Where the speaker can be identified, we have cited the 
appropriate ID. In the recordings of group sessions, however, it 
was rarely possible to identify individual speakers, and 
quotations are cited accordingly, e.g. ‘Developer, Threat 
Modelling.’ We have edited the quotations to protect 
confidentiality and indicate context: square brackets show 
additions and replacements; ellipses show removals. 
V. RESULTS 
A. Intervention Time Requirements 
Figure 1 shows the timeline needed for the interventions. 
On-the-job Training is not shown as it was instigated by the 
team leads, not the external intervener. As will be seen, despite 
the long-elapsed time, the total effort required from the 
intervener was relatively short: a total of two days, of which at 
least four hours were research interviews and not part of the 
intervention itself. So, the effort spent for the total intervention 
was less than one working day. Adding another day for 
preparation – scheduling, preparing materials for the workshops, 
etc. – the total time spent by the intervener on the interventions 
was less than two working days. 
About 15 people, from both development teams, attended the 
incentivization and threat modelling workshops, which were 
sequential, each taking 1 hour 15 minutes, with a break between. 
Roughly six people – the two architects and several senior 
developers – attended the follow-up sessions, which were an 
hour each. Some ten attended the exit workshop of 45 minutes. 
Thus, the total time investment from the development team was 
in the region of 60 man hours, which is about half a day’s effort 
for a 15-person team.  
         
B. Discussion Topics 
Figure 2 summarizes the kinds of discourse in the 
discussions. 
We were surprised to find about half of the discussion 
involved participants, including the facilitator, presenting 
knowledge in different ways in response to the issues raised. A 
proportion of this was what we call ‘war stories’ – complete 
anecdotes relevant, or partially relevant to the discussion. A 
relatively small amount of the total time (which included the 
Figure 1: Project Calendar 
10:00:00
12:00:00
14:00:00
16:00:00
18:00:00
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Exit 
interviews
Final 
workshop
Incentivization 
session
Threat 
modelling
Continuous 
reminder 
(videocon)
Continuous 
reminder 
(videocon)
Sep Oct Nov Dec
 
Total Cost 
Intervention facilitator: 15 man hours 
Development team: 60 man hours 
ID Experience Role Team 
A1 17 years Architect & Lead Demigods 
A2 2 years Developer Demigods 
A3 14 years Senior developer Superheroes 
A4 3 years Developer Superheroes 
Table 1: Interviewee Roles 
 
Figure 2: Workshop Topics by Words Used 
 
Presenting knowledge Identifying threats/attackers
Brainstorming Banter
War story
game) was spent on brainstorming; but the other major 
proportion was, as one would expect, spent identifying threats 
and attackers. A sign of good esprit-de-corps among the team 
was the level of ‘banter’ – shared jokes and friendly insults – 
between themselves. 
The participants clearly enjoyed and learned from the 
incentivization game workshop [30]: 
The game was fun, I did enjoy the game. And it was 
proving as per usual, that... whatever you do, you are 
going to lose somewhere (A3) 
Actually, it was very useful… [showing] you cannot 
always know the right answer. (A2) 
The Threat Modelling workshop generated some ways of 
thinking and conclusions that were unexpected for the 
participants. 
I never really thought about 'who would', so much, until 
you put up 'why would somebody and who would they be' 
(A4) 
In the first follow-up session (not recorded), we discussed 
prioritization of the mitigations arising from the Threat 
Modelling session. The main learning point for the participants 
was that the decisions were mostly for the product manager; not 
for the ‘security expert’. 
The second follow-up session was a discussion about their 
progress so far implementing mitigations, plus a technical 
discussion about industry experience with encryption as a 
mitigation. 
What [are] the advantages of database encryption, and 
what would that give us, compared to application level 
encryption… and risks with encryption itself?  
(Architect) 
Finally, we carried out the exit interviews to help identify the 
outcomes, as follows.  
C. Outcomes Attributable to the Interventions 
We can identify two significant improvements in the 
Ambassador product and process security as a result of the 
interventions. Beforehand, the developers had been thinking of 
security improvements as line by line improvements in the code 
they themselves had written. Afterwards, they understood that 
their most effective security improvements were likely to be 
elsewhere. Specifically, they made two changes: 
1. They introduced a component security checker to their build 
cycle, and embarked on a program of updating and replacing 
components according to their security vulnerabilities. 
We [have built] the OWASP dependency checker into 
our build process, … and established a process for how 
we deal with new vulnerabilities in existing libraries, or 
adding new libraries or upgrading libraries. (A1) 
2. They identified their own existing customers as competitors 
with each other, and therefore potential ‘attackers’, and 
identified that the permissions functionality was therefore a 
major privacy issue; making fixes in this area was likely to 
give security wins: 
I have a … task to check user permissions, and check 
that a user has access to that specific entity or a set of 
those entities (A2)  
D. Learning Attributable to the Interventions 
We looked for evidence of learning by workshop 
participants. From the transcripts, we identified three insights: 
1. The importance of using secure and up-to-date components. 
[Learning about updating components] tends to stick in 
your memory. I would never trust a third-party library 
with anything that is going to the user (A4) 
2. Security issues related to business functionality can be as 
important as technical aspects of security. 
I find it a little concerning that there are so many attacks 
that we traditionally haven't mitigated against. … Stuff 
like social engineering. (Participant, Threat Modelling) 
3. Decisions on “what security fixes should we implement?” 
are for product management, not technical developers. 
I guess, one challenge, as always, is playing what we, as 
architects, believe are the most pressing security 
concerns, against what customers are asking for in terms 
of dealing with security concerns. (A1) 
E. Outcomes Not Attributable to the Interventions 
As we discussed in Section IV, the team leads were already 
interested in software security. We anticipate, therefore, that 
they would have made some improvements even without the 
external interventions we provided. From the initial interviews 
with A1 and A3 we identified two such improvements that 
would likely have occurred without the interventions: 
First, they had already identified the OWASP Top 10 [35] as 
being important, and understood the need for regular 
reinforcement of the security message. So, although one direct 
outcome of the Threat Modelling session was agreement to 
study a new OWASP threat each month – an intervention that 
fits nicely as a Continuous Reminder – this might have happened 
without our intervention. 
We also decided to introduce a knowledge improvement 
process, that wasn't too costly, and didn't distract too 
much from what we were trying to do.  And basically, we 
decided that we would take the OWASP Top Ten, 
starting at No.1, and every release, we would focus on 
that, in some capacity. (Architect, follow-up session 2) 
Second, they made the interesting experiment of assigning 
one of the team as ‘saboteur’, with the task of deliberately 
inserting security defects for others to find. In practice, whilst it 
kept a focus on security, this technique proved unpleasant for 
the team member assigned, so is unlikely to be continued, nor 
tried as an intervention elsewhere.  
The saboteur didn't enjoy being a saboteur ... So, it is on 
hold at the moment until we can figure out how to make 
it work, or whether it is a good idea in the long term. 
(Participants, follow-up session 2) 
F. Problems, and How They Were Overcome 
Analyzing the workshops in more detail, we identified 
several problems encountered in carrying out the security 
enhancements. We have termed these ‘blockers’, and against 
them we have identified successful ‘motivators’ that permitted 
team members to overcome them. Table 2 shows the four most 
important such blockers and their corresponding motivators. 
G. General Feedback on the Process 
We had some overall feedback during the second follow-up 
session, suggesting that the developers’ own ratings of the 
intervention impact were lukewarm.  
I did a quick survey this morning to find out how people 
thought the process had gone. … And most people 
thought, it was about average, in terms of effectiveness.  
So, on a scale of one to five, it was a little under 3, but 
not terrible. (Team lead) 
In view of the time cost, however, the leaders felt the 
involvement had been successful. 
It doesn't feel like it has distracted significantly from the 
ongoing development process, so that is worth balancing 
against how much effort (Team lead 2) 
H. Opportunities for Improvement 
While our primary goal from the intervention was to 
improve the security of code delivered by the team, a secondary 
goal was to empower participants to deliver secure code in 
future. Accordingly, in the exit interviews we were interested to 
what extent they had understood the process as well as learning 
about security and its application to the Ambassador product. To 
avoid leading questions, we phrased this as an open question: 
Let’s imagine there’s a team starting a similar project 
now… What would you recommend that’s the same as we 
did, and how would you recommend improving it? 
The resulting answers and discussion around them showed 
the understanding of specific threats they had encountered, of 
Table 2: Blockers and Motivators 
Blocker Motivator 
The difficulty of incorporating a component analyser tool in 
the toolchain, especially given they were using a number of 
components that were not supported by that tool. 
The time-consuming bit was trying to get [the tool] to 
recognize more obscure libraries that we use… we 
probably spent a man-week's work of time, manually 
Googling. (A1) 
The enthusiasm on the part of the open-source tool 
implementers for incorporating AyCo’s suggestions.  
We have been able to feed into the tool a bit as well, 
which has been nice... They have been very responsive 
in terms of issues that we have raised, and suggestions 
for improvements (A1) 
The significant work involved in upgrading a range of 
components, and modifying the code to support the upgraded 
APIs.  
We haven't necessarily got to as much of [the 
component upgrading] as we would have liked to. (A3) 
Representing the upgrades as explicit stories for scheduling: 
Hopefully, the architect guys… [will] try and feed 
some of those stories in. (A3) 
And the satisfaction of seeing ‘red lights’ turn green as the 
components were updated. 
You've got lights that you can turn green - it becomes 
relatively straight forward to go through turning them 
green, one after another until they are all green (A1)  
More generally, the additional work involved in implementing 
and prioritising security enhancements.  
[Only] a certain amount of our road map time is given 
to architecture. And we have ended up diverting most 
of that time to addressing security vulnerabilities in 
one way or another, since you first came. And there is 
still more to do.  The downside of that is, obviously, 
that we don't address other architectural concerns like 
performance, or code quality. (A1) 
The benefits of security as a feature, whether tick box 
support for the audits of potential customers, or actual unique 
selling propositions when compared with others. 
I think it has come at just the right time for us, because 
… the world is moving forward in terms of 
expectations around security… [and] we are getting 
more customers for whom security is a bigger concern 
(A1) 
The difficulty of learning from existing security sources. 
I still find reading the OWASP stuff difficult. (A3) 
Learning as a group. 
We’ve adopted this idea of focussing on a particular 
one of the OWASP Top Ten each release.  I think that 
went pretty well in the first release. (A1) 
 
prioritization, and an increased understanding of Component 
Choice.  
 [I’d] address the most important threats, and first 
implement those things, that would help us to address … 
attacks that would be more harmful (A2) 
The OWASP stuff... Libraries, definitely, don't use 
anything old, always. (A3) 
More security focus… [for example] if it was a site 
where I was taking user details, I am aware now of EU 
regulations… it has to be stored securely. (A4) 
Only A1, the lead architect appreciated the importance of the 
interventions as a process to achieve that. 
I think the workshop approach was really good fun, and 
really interesting.  I think brainstorming threats and 
vulnerabilities and assets was really helpful.  (A1) 
That suggests a need in future interventions for some more 
explanation of the process and reasons for it. That might be 
appropriate as a short presentation by the facilitator at the start, 
and even shorter ‘milestone’ presentations before each later 
session. A participant also suggested introducing a checklist. 
I think maybe some sort of tick sheet in terms of 'have 
you got these things in place' to take away, that might be 
a good addition (A1). 
It might be demotivating to do this at the start, risking being 
perceived as telling participants ‘what to do’ [36]. Instead we 
plan to introduce such a checklist after the initial workshops, 
thus enhancing the perceived effectiveness as discussed in 
section F above.  
In terms of improvements to the research methodology, we 
have identified two key limitations of our approach in this 
project, and plan to redress them in future work as follows: 
Need for evidence 
whether the change is 
long-term 
Repeat exit interviews one year after 
intervention, so see if enhancements 
have been retained. 
Need for quantitative 
evidence 
Apply a scoring system for the 
team’s security activities and 
knowledge before and after the 
interventions. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
A. Improvements on Existing Practice 
Current practice in interventions is often based on 
Penetration Testing. Aside from the high cost [29], this approach 
can prove ineffective in the longer term [18].  
The approach described in this paper is significantly less 
costly, in that the skills required are the much more readily-
available ones associated with facilitation. It also requires a 
smaller amount of effort from the interveners.  
While it is early to know the long-term impact, it is probable 
that that the team will preserve their component security 
evaluation and upgrade process, and that the understanding will 
remain of the business functionality being a part of the security 
story. The motivation of the team towards security has also 
remained throughout the three months of the pilot; given the 
team’s increased understanding of the business impact of 
security issues there is at least a reasonable possibility that it will 
remain long-term. 
This intervention approach, therefore, offers inexpensive 
and impactful security improvements for development teams 
like those at AyCo. 
B. Conclusion and Future Work 
In this case study, the authors used a light-touch facilitation-
based ‘intervention’ to two productive and successful 
development teams.  The intervention required limited effort 
from the facilitator, and relatively little from the development 
teams. The authors demonstrated, via Participative Action 
Research and detailed coding, evidence of improved 
understanding of several important lessons in software security; 
also, two significant security enhancements implemented for the 
product as a result.  
A single case study is insufficient to draw conclusions about 
the general effectiveness of this kind of intervention. Further 
work in this project includes trialing the interventions with other 
kinds of software development teams and comparing and 
differentiating the consequences. Further future work suggested 
by the section ‘Opportunities for Improvement’ above is to 
empower the participants by improving the process, and even to 
have the researchers train facilitators among the participants 
rather than providing the facilitation themselves. 
Lightweight, facilitation-based, interventions of the kind 
used here offer the potential to help many software development 
teams improve their software security. Wider-scale adoption of 
the process will empower developers and play a much-needed 
role in improve software security for all end users. 
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